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ABSTRACT 
 
In the current context of globalization, where firms are increasingly operating in networks of relationships with 
international subsidiaries, the relevance of their corporate governance has become evident. By the same token, 
the contribution to corporate governance of expatriates in these subsidiaries has become an important topic of 
discussion. The literature is not unanimous in recognizing the contribution of expatriates. However, the question 
as to whether the participation of expatriates in the management of international firms’ subsidiaries is a critical 
success factor for their corporate governance has not been fully analyzed. This article presents the results of a 
study of a leading international firm - Vale - that investigated this question from a network perspective, with a 
view to narrowing this gap. The case study method was adopted and data collected from various sources - 
documental investigation, structured questionnaires and interviews. The results suggested that expatriates can 
contribute  to  the  success  of  corporate  governance,  especially  through  informal  elements  pertinent  to  social 
mechanisms of governance, such as commitment, communication, flexibility, trust and interdependence. The 
study thus provided insights for both managers of international firms and academics on corporate governance 
from a network perspective.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In order to meet the increasing needs of customers and thus sustain a competitive advantage in the 
current context of globalization, international firms, in most sectors, are joining forces and operating 
in networks of relationships with other firms, including their own subsidiaries. Their success thus 
depends,  in  part,  on  harmonizing  the  interests  of  firms  subject  to  different  legislations,  market 
practices and cultures. Given the challenge and complexity of managing these networks (Strikwerda, 
2003),  the  importance  of  corporate  governance  in  the  promotion  of  transparent  and  healthy 
international relationships has become evident. This has sparked a debate regarding the contribution of 
expatriate subsidiary managers to the corporate governance of international firms. The literature is not 
unanimous in recognizing their contribution (Bjorkman, 2004; Volkmar, 2003). However, the role of 
expatriates, especially where corporate governance is concerned, has not as yet been fully investigated 
or empirically tested (Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004; Riusala & Suutari, 2004). 
In order to help narrow this gap, we carried out a study at the leading iron ore company, Vale, in an 
attempt to answer the following research question: Is the participation of Vale’s expatriates in the 
management of its international subsidiaries a critical success factor for its corporate governance?  
The purpose of this article is to present the most relevant results of this study that was undertaken 
from a network perspective and whose specific objectives were to verify whether expatriate managers 
of Vale’s international subsidiaries indeed contribute to the success of its corporate governance, and 
how they do so. It is hoped that the article can provide some valuable insights for both academia and 
managers concerned with the corporate governance of international firms and role of their expatriates.  
Vale is a world leader in its sector and has been undergoing a vigorous internationalization process, 
leading it to establish several wholly owned subsidiaries organized into a network of relationships with 
the parent company (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce [CVRD], 2005, 2009). It was thus assumed that it 
had advanced managerial network practices that could also be of interest to firms with international 
subsidiaries in other sectors.  
Scientific studies usually analyze the expatriation theme from the perspective of human resources 
management  (Bueno,  2004).  Although  recognizing  that  the  latter  is  important  for  expatriates’ 
performance,  our  study  attempted  to  add  value  by  concentrating  on  corporate  governance  as  a 
fundamental  construct  of  network  management.  Note  that  we  focused  on  Vale’s  wholly  owned 
international subsidiaries that were in operation in 2006 and its network of relationships with them at 
that time. 
The article is divided into four parts, in addition to this introduction. The first and second parts 
explain  the  theoretical  references  and  research  methodology.  The  third  presents  the  study’s  main 
results and discusses the extent to which its suppositions are confirmed. The last part assesses the 
study’s contributions and makes suggestions for future research.  
 
 
THEORETICAL REFERENCES 
 
 
First  of  all,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  we  assumed  that  the  relationships  between  a  parent 
company  and  its  wholly  owned  international  subsidiaries  could  be  analyzed  using  the  strategic 
network concept. Indeed, the study aimed at contributing to a better understanding of expatriates’ role 
in ensuring the success of corporate governance, by adopting a network approach, i.e., taking into 
account the positive and negative strategic implications of the company’s network of relationships 
with its subsidiaries, considering the network’s characteristics.  
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Literature Review and Definitions 
 
To define the network concept, most studies, especially those concerning multinational firms (Lü, 
2001),  have  adopted  an  inter-organizational  perspective.  Their  object  has  generally  been  the 
relationships  established  between  multinational  firms  and  their  international  partners  (suppliers, 
customers,  competitors,  etc.).  Our  study,  however,  was  undertaken  from  an  intra-organizational 
perspective (Lü, 2001), where the parent company is the focal firm, and its object is the network of 
relationships between the parent company and its wholly owned international subsidiaries, assuming 
that the latter have a degree of autonomy similar to that enjoyed by other international partners.  
This view of multinational corporations as a network of intra-organizational relationships is not 
entirely  new.  Our  contribution  is  to  adopt  inter-organizational  network  constructs  to  carry  out  a 
strategic network analysis at an intra-organizational level. We assume that we can thus gain insights 
that could not be found by way of the traditional intra-organizational network analysis.  
The concept of strategic network draws on that of Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000), but its scope is 
broadened  by  adding  the  intra-organizational  dimension  for  the  specific  case  of  the  relationships 
between  the  parent  firm  and  its  wholly  owned  subsidiaries.  Because  it  includes  the  relationships 
between  legally  distinct  entities  that  enjoy  a  certain  degree  of  autonomy  and  analyzes  these 
relationships from a strategic network perspective, the research considered that it would be possible to 
use Macedo-Soares´s (2002) Strategic Network Analysis [SNA] model. This model has indeed been 
applied with success to many types of firms embedded in networks (Macedo-Soares & Figueira, 2007; 
Macedo-Soares,  Tauhata,  &  Freitas,  2004;  Macedo-Soares,  Tauhata,  &  Lima,  2005).  It  was  only 
necessary  to  adapt  the  model  in  order  to  also  contemplate  specific  intra-organizational  network 
variables.  
The  definition  of  strategic  network  was  also  reformulated  by  us  as  follows:  a  firm’s  strategic 
network is composed of its relationships – horizontal and vertical – with other organizations, whether 
they  are  suppliers,  customers,  competitors,  subsidiaries  or  other  entities.  These  relationships  are 
composed  of  intra-organizational  in the  specific  case  of  networks  between  a firm  and  its 
subsidiaries that show a degree of relative autonomy – or resistant inter-organizational ties, ... 
that are strategically important to the member firm (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). 
It should be added that, drawing on Gao, Bao and Wang’s (2002) definition of international strategic 
alliances,  international  strategic  networks  were  defined  as  those  that  provide  opportunities  for 
obtaining international competitive advantages.  
A broad definition was also adopted for corporate governance, drawing on Cornelius and Kogut (as 
cited  in  Cornelius,  2005,  p.  13)  which  included  both  formal  and  social  corporate  governance 
mechanisms:  
the system constituted by the institutions, laws, values and formal and informal rules, that produce 
the different legal and organizational forms found in a country and which in turn, determine the 
distribution of powers – how authority is designated, management decisions taken and monitored, 
how information is audited and published, and profits and benefits allocated and distributed.  
Kauser  and  Shaw  (2004)  observed  that  behavioral  characteristics  have  a  greater  impact  on  the 
performance of international strategic relationships than organizational characteristics. Characteristics 
such as commitment, interdependence, coordination and communication are seen to be factors that 
make success possible, whereas characteristics such as structure and control mechanisms appear not to 
be determining factors in the success of such relationships. In a complementary fashion, Bachmann 
(2001) analyzed trust and power as trans-organizational alliance coordination mechanisms. In addition, 
Costa  (2007)  discussed  the  trust  and  control  relationship  as  complementary  mechanisms  for  the 
governance  of  organizational relations, and  presented  key  implications  for theory  building  on  the 
subject.   Contribution  of  Expatriates  in  the  Management  of  Subsidiaries  to  the  Corporate  Governance  of 
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In line with the views of Bachmann (2001) and Kauser and Shaw (2004), Moraes (2005) identified 
five variables associated with social corporate governance mechanisms from a network perspective: 
commitment, communication, flexibility, trust and interdependence. Moraes also analyzed the power 
variable associated with formal corporate governance mechanisms. His study was restricted to a single 
country and therefore did not contemplate variables for international firms.   
In our research, we drew on Bueno (2004), Clarke and Lipp (1998), Meschi (1997) and Rodriguez 
(2005)  to  include  tools  of  cultural  integration  as  a  variable  that  is  pertinent  to  social  corporate 
governance mechanisms for networks in an international context.  
Several factors motivate the participation of expatriates in the management of the international units 
of  multinational  firms.  In  their  seminal  work,  Edström  and  Galbraith  (1977)  identified  three 
motivating  factors:  i)  transfer  of  technical  knowledge  to  a  developing  country;  ii)  managerial 
development of the expatriate executive; iii) a strategy to coordinate and control the subsidiary. With 
respect  to  headquarters-subsidiary  knowledge  transfer  of  international  firms,  Lee  and  MacMillan 
(2008)  found  that  coordinative  knowledge-sharing  was  positively  associated  with  subsidiary 
performance.  
Boyacigiller (1990) analyzed motivating factors based on subsidiary characteristics that influence an 
international appointment: a) the political risk of the country where the subsidiary is located; b) the 
subsidiary’s complexity; c) the cultural distance between the parent company’s country and that of the 
subsidiary; d) the interdependence between the parent company and subsidiaries.  
In  connection  with  the  importance  of  taking  into  account  the  subsidiary’s  characteristics,  Kim, 
Prescott and Kim (2005) examined the effects of agency problems in the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships  on  corporate  governance  design  in  transnational  corporations.  They  argued  that  the 
corporate governance of foreign subsidiaries in such corporations should be constructed in response to 
different levels of agency problems according to the subsidiaries´ varying strategic roles.  
Based on documental research, it was observed that Vale expatriates its employees when the country 
in which its subsidiary is located does not have people with the necessary technical and managerial 
competences required for key positions, or when appropriate conditions for the development of skills 
are absent (CVRD, 2005).  
Note that various definitions of the term expatriate were identified in the literature. As we focused 
on Vale, we adopted the definition used by this company, according to which an expatriate is an 
employee who is transferred to another country for a period of more than 3 months.  
As already mentioned, there is virtually no consensus in the literature regarding the contribution of 
expatriate subsidiary managers to the corporate governance of international firms.  
Some studies analyze the participation of expatriates in the strategic management of firms from the 
point of view of the exchange of knowledge and information, cultural integration (Clarke & Lipp, 
1998; Meschi, 1997), and the transmission of the values, rules and regulations of their unit of origin 
(Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004; Riusala & Suutari, 2004).  
More  wide-ranging  studies  relate  the  interchange  of  knowledge  to  accountability,  to  conduct 
standardization and to transparency and control of the international relationship (Boyacigiller, 1990; 
Fenwick, De Cieri, & Welch, 1999; Harzing, 2001). To some extent, these studies also analyze the 
participation  of  expatriates  in  the  management  of  international  units  from  the  point  of  view  of 
corporate governance of the parent company’s relationships with these units. Our study adopted a 
similar approach.   
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Assumptions 
 
The study was based on the following assumptions: (A1) the Vale parent company and its wholly 
owned international subsidiaries form an international strategic network; (A2) the network can be 
governed using both formal and social mechanisms; (A3) researchers in strategic management have 
identified indicators to measure the use of formal and social corporate governance mechanisms; (A4) 
the corporate governance of networks of international relationships is a critical success factor for the 
effective management of these networks; (A5) the perceptions of the firm’s executives are a valid 
source of strategic information because they play a significant role in strategic management (Kotha & 
Vadlamani, 1995). 
 
Suppositions 
 
On the basis of the theoretical references of the research, and in order to answer its central question, 
we formulated the following 3 suppositions:  
(S1) the participation of expatriates in the management of Vale’s international subsidiaries can be a 
critical success factor for the corporate governance of the company’s network of relationships with 
these subsidiaries to the extent that they contribute informal elements pertinent to social mechanisms 
of corporate governance;  
(S2) the Vale parent company perceives that it benefits from the participation of expatriates in the 
management of its international subsidiaries due to their contribution to the corporate governance of 
the parent company → subsidiary relationship;  
(S3) the international subsidiaries also perceive that they benefit from the participation of the Vale 
parent  company’s  expatriates  in  their  management  due  to  their  contribution  to  the  corporate 
governance of the subsidiary→ parent company relationship. 
 
Conceptual Tools  
 
The model of strategic analysis adopted in this study is the SNA Model. Although this model does 
not contemplate intra-organizational networks, it was deemed adequate following some adaptations, 
beginning with a broadened definition of the strategic network (see Section Literature Review and 
Definitions).  
Drawing  mainly on Galaskiewicz and Zaheer (1999), and Gulati et al. (2000), the SNA  model 
includes two reference lists with constructs for carrying out strategic analyses at both industry and 
firm  levels  from  a  network  perspective.  Three  dimensions  are  used  at  both  levels:  (1)  Network 
Structure - Centrality of parent firm: high centrality in the network has positive implications (Zaheer 
& Zaheer, 1997 as cited in Gulati et al.), (2) Network composition - Identity and Status of parent firm 
and subsidiaries: high status has positive implications, (3) Nature of Ties – Strength which has positive 
implications inasmuch as it can contribute to the inimitability of positive relational characteristics 
(Dyer & Nobeoka as cited in Gulati et al., 2000). A fourth dimension is considered at the firm level: 
(4)  Network  Management  which  includes  the  governance  construct.  This  dimension  is  therefore 
focused on in this study. However, information regarding the other two dimensions is taken into 
account.  
Based in part on the corporate governance variables used by Moraes (2005), which in turn drew on 
the SNA model, our study proposed a new list of variables and indicators pertinent to formal and 
social corporate governance mechanisms (see Table 1).  
 Contribution  of  Expatriates  in  the  Management  of  Subsidiaries  to  the  Corporate  Governance  of 
International Firms: the Case of Vale 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 7, n. 1, art. 6, pp. 98-114, Jan./Mar. 2010           www.anpad.org.br/bar 
103
Table 1 
 
Variables and Indicators for Corporate Governance  
 
Variables  Indicators  Sub-indicators 
Power  Non-coercive/ 
Coercive 
• Punishment/penalization Inability/ Ability (Bachmann, 2001; Dickson & 
Zhang, 2004) 
• Inability/ Ability to threaten (Dickson & Zhang, 2004) 
• Existence/ Non-existence of power through assistance: power established 
through  dependence  on  the  more  powerful  partner  (Dickson  &  Zhang, 
2004) 
• Existence/ Non-existence of power through reward from the partnership 
(Dickson & Zhang, 2004) 
Commitment 
Collaborative 
And Ethical 
Behavior 
Collaborative 
Opportunistic 
• Desire/ Lack of desire to maintain a relationship (Bantham, Celuch, & 
Kasouf, 2003; Hunt & Morgan, 1994) 
• Non-existence/Existence of the option to change a partner (Bantham et 
al., 2003) 
Communi-
cation 
Frank/ 
Non-existent 
• Clear/ Ambiguous communication (Wagner, Macbeth, & Boddy, 2002) 
• Regular/ Irregular communication between partners is frequent (Wagner et 
al., 2002) 
• Existence/ Non-existence of formal meetings to share information and 
knowledge (Wagner et al., 2002) 
Awareness/ Lack of awareness of information concerning a partner 
(Wagner et al., 2002) 
Flexibility  Flexible/ 
Rigid 
• Ability/ Inability to adjust behavior on the part of the partner (Heide & 
Miner, 1992) 
• Agility/ Lack of agility to respond rapidly to changes (Prater, Biehl, & 
Smith, 2001) 
• Low/ High cost of change associated with agility of response and capacity 
to adapt to new conditions (e.g. shipping by air is quicker but more 
expensive than by sea) (Prater et al., 2001) 
Existence/ Non-existence of case-by-case decisions - in the case of extreme 
rigidity, pre-established formal rules hold and decisions are never taken on a 
case-by-case basis (Segil, 1998) 
Trust  Existent/ 
Non-existent 
• Expectation that a partner will/will not act opportunistically, even 
though such behavior would certainly provide him with benefits in the short 
term and perhaps also in the long term (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Hunt & 
Morgan, 1994) 
• Partner’s solid/weak reputation for trustworthiness (Chiles & McMackin, 
1996) 
• Moderate / excessive heeding of contractual rules reflecting lack of trust 
(Chiles & McMackin, 1996) 
Perception of a low/ high risk that agreements will not be fulfilled 
(Bachmann, 2001) 
Interdepen-
dence 
Recognized/ 
Not recognized  
• Perception of the importance/ insignificance of a partner for the firm’s 
own success (Moraes, 2005) 
Impossibility/ Possibility of quickly changing a partner (Heide & Miner, 
1992) 
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Table 1 (continued)  
 
Variables  Indicators  Sub-indicators 
Cultural 
integration  
High/ 
Low 
• Existence/ Non-existence of mapping and control of cultural 
differences (Meschi, 1997) 
• Non-occurrence/ Occurrence of conflicts caused by cultural 
differences (Meschi, 1997) 
Note. (N.B. Indicators with positive implications are in bold type and those with negative implications in italics). 
 
The following may be highlighted among the differences introduced in relation to Moraes’ version 
(2005):  (i)  definition  of  sub-indicators  in  order  to  assess  better  the  indicator’s  implications;  (ii) 
adaptation to the intra-organizational nature of the relationships of the network under analysis; (v) 
addition of the cultural integration variable because of its importance to international firms.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
 
Choice of Methods and Design 
 
In  keeping  with  its  specific  objectives,  our  research  was  predominantly  descriptive,  with  some 
exploratory  characteristics;  it  was  conducted  using  the  case  study  method  which,  given  their 
complexity, was considered an appropriate means of investigating networks (Halinen & Törnroos, 
2005). 
This  method  is  usually  chosen  when  the  purpose  of  the  research  is  to  understand  how  a 
contemporary phenomenon occurs in the light of its specific contingencies of the context (Patton, 
1987;  Yin,  2003).  However,  as  Yin  observed,  “the  case  study  is  an  umbrella  term  …;  different 
orientations and approaches may fall within its domain” (p. 51). He gives the example of a dissertation 
that adopted this method to understand the interrelationships between a group’s corporate strategy and 
the strategies of the independent subsidiaries in the group, noting that although a variety of evidence 
was collected, the focus of the analytical work was on quantitative issues that employed statistical 
packages.  
To some extent, we adopted the same focus in our study at Vale. The main objective was to obtain 
data and information in order to verify the suppositions, but not to attempt to analyze it in the light of 
the specific contingencies of the parent company and each one of its 12 subsidiaries. This was beyond 
the scope of the study’s objectives, for which it was not deemed necessary to enter into the level of 
detail regarding the subsidiaries that would be required for a deeper analysis. Most of the background 
information collected was therefore limited to relevant characteristics of the network investigated, 
according to the main SNA dimensions.  
To ensure the reliability and reproducibility of the study, we established a protocol with a statement 
of its objectives and a plan indicating how these were to be achieved. In this plan, the theoretical 
references and the study’s 3 main suppositions were fundamental for defining field procedures and 
issues. Indeed, the SNA general constructs, as well as a detailed list of variables for network corporate 
governance (Table 1) formed the basis for developing the data collection instruments and establishing 
data treatment methods. These are detailed below. The two protocol issues that reflect the study’s 
main concerns were: i) evaluation of the network of relationships between the Vale parent company 
and  its  international  subsidiaries;  ii)  participation  of  expatriates  in  the  management  of  Vale’s 
international subsidiaries. 
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Data Collection 
 
The  following  methods  were  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  method  triangulation  strategy 
recommended by Patton (1987) and Yin (2003): documental/telematic investigations, questionnaires 
and follow-up interviews to capture executives’ perceptions. The objective of this strategy is, when 
applicable, to triangulate, in the sense of confronting and comparing data collected through different 
means and sources and retaining only the most consistent one, “following a corroboratory mode” (Yin, 
2003, p. 92) in order to ensure greater reliability and accuracy of the results. 
The  questionnaire  was  divided  into  two  parts,  in  keeping  with  the  main  protocol  issues,  and 
structured according to Likert scales (1-5; 1-3). First the questionnaire was tested with representative 
members of the study’s population to assess its clarity and reliability. After making adjustments on the 
basis of this test, it was sent by e-mail to the expatriate and local managers that took part in the study. 
In order to preserve the latter’s confidentiality, the data is presented in its consolidated form and the 
contents of the interviews used to cross-check the questionnaires’ results are not included in this 
article.   
 
Universe and Population 
 
The universe of wholly-owned subsidiaries focused on in the study was selected according to three 
criteria: (1) it was located abroad (in relation to the parent company); (2) it had management-level 
expatriates that had been sent by the parent company; (3) it had local managers that had not been 
previously employed by the parent company.  
Therefore, the following 12 subsidiaries of Vale were chosen: CVRD International S.A. [CVRDi], 
RD Manganèse Europe [RDME], DOCENAVE Argentina S.R.L. [Docenave Argentina], Compañia 
Minera Miski Mayo S.A.C. [Miski Mayo], CVRD Venezuela S.A. [CVRD Venezuela], RD Australia 
Pty Ltd [RD Australia], RD Asia Shangai, RD Asia Tokyo, Tethys Mining LLC [TETHYS], RD 
South Africa (Proprietary) Limited (RDSA), RD Moçambique Ltda [RDMZ], Compagnie Minière 
Trois Rivières [CMTR] and Compañia Minera Latino Americana Ltda [CMLA]. 
This universe of companies contained a total of 68 expatriates and 391 local employees (November, 
2006), with 49 expatriates and 42 local employees holding management positions. Expatriate and local 
employees were treated as separate populations. The minimum necessary response rate was calculated 
in accordance with Rea and Parker’s (1997) formula for small populations, and after establishing a 
confidence interval of 95%, with a margin of error of ±10%. Thus, a response rate of 25 expatriate and 
21 local managers was found to be sufficient. In reality, the response exceeded these numbers: 30 
expatriate managers and 24 local managers returned completed questionnaires.  
 
Data Treatment 
 
The data collected through the questionnaires were treated statistically in order to calculate each 
question’s  sample  averages  for  expatriate  and  local  managers,  respectively.  These  averages  were 
compared, using the statistical analysis of variance method [ANOVA] (McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 
2001). For questions where there was no evidence of population variance equality, the latter was 
replaced by the Kruskal-Wallis (McClave et al., 2001) non-parametric test.  
In the case of the interviews, content analysis techniques (categorizations of subjective information 
based on frequency of occurrence) were used to carry out the necessary inferences (Weber, 1990).  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Results 
 
As can be observed in Table 2, the results of the first part of the questionnaire strongly suggest that 
the participation of the Vale parent company in the network of relationships with its international 
subsidiaries was perceived by managers in these subsidiaries as a fundamental part of its strategy (see 
Question - Q 1, Expat Av. 4.3; Loc. Av. 3.8 on Max 5 Likert scale). This result is significant because 
it provides support for the assumption that what is at issue in the study is indeed a strategic network 
and that the Vale parent company is viewed as having a strategic role in this network.  
 
Table 2 
 
Statistical Results of the 1
st Part of the Questionnaire 
 
Question  Construct based 
on the SNA model 
Max.  
Likert 
Scale 
Expat 
Aver. 
Local 
Aver. 
p-value  High-est 
1 – Does participation of the Vale 
parent company in the network of 
relationships with its international 
subsidiaries constitute a fundamental 
part of its strategy?  
  5  4.3  3.8  0.034  Expat 
2 –Evaluate the strength of 
connections between Vale and its 
international subsidiaries.  
Strength of 
connections  3  2.5  2.3  0.301  - 
3 – Evaluate Vale’s position of 
centrality in its network of 
relationships with its international 
subsidiaries.   
Centrality position   3  2.7  2.5  0.433  - 
4 - Incentives to the Vale parent 
company’s internationalization process 
provided by governmental authorities. 
Government 
incentives for its 
internationaliza-
tion process  
3  1.5  1.6*  0.706  - 
5 – Investments made by Vale parent 
company in its subsidiaries.  
 
 
Making of invest-
ments by parent 
company in subsi-
diary relationships 
3  2.1  1.9  0.116  - 
6 – Comparison of Vale parent 
company with its competitors 
regarding relationships with 
international subsidiaries. 
  3  1.8  1.4  0.044  Expat 
7 – Level of interna-tional 
subsidiaries’ delegation of authority. 
 
  
Level of 
decentralization via 
authority 
delegation 
3  1.4  1.3  0.409  - 
8 – Use of most modern corporate 
governance practices  
Use of governance 
mechanisms  5  3.4  2.8  0.028  Expat 
Note. * This result was not considered valid, as 79% of local employees did not reply to this question.  
N.B. For questions of the first part, the standard deviation showed a value equal to or lower than 1.0. Contribution  of  Expatriates  in  the  Management  of  Subsidiaries  to  the  Corporate  Governance  of 
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The  latter  is  corroborated  by  the  positive  result  regarding  the  question  on  Vale’s  position  of 
centrality in this network (Q. 3, Expat Av. 2.7; Loc. Av. 2.5 on Max 3 Likert). As a network structure 
attribute, we saw that, in the literature, high centrality is considered to have positive implications for 
network management. These implications are enhanced when the relationships of the network are of 
significant strength, as in the case of Vale, according to the results of Question 3 (Expat. Av. 2.5; 
Loc. Av. 2.3 for Max 3 Likert).  
Investments by the Vale parent company in its international subsidiaries are also an indicator of its 
strategic role in the relationships with them and of the strength of connections. The results of this 
question were also quite positive (Q. 5, Expat Av. 2.1; Loc. Av. 1.9 - Max 3 Likert), although not to 
the same extent as in the case of the other three questions.  
Among the other results in the first part of the questionnaire, the only really significant ones were 
those concerning the use of modern corporate governance practices. As shown in Table 2 (see Q. 8, 
Expat Av. 3.4; Local Av. 2.8 - Max 5 Likert), the results for this question were also fairly positive. 
Earlier we mentioned that we chose Vale for the study because it was an international leader in its 
sector and, therefore, presumably employed advanced managerial practices. These results lend support 
to our point precisely in the category of practices – corporate governance – focused on in the study.  
The  results  of  the  other  questions  in  this  first  part  of  the  questionnaire  were  not  considered 
conclusive,  even  after  an  attempt  to  obtain  more  information  through  the  interviews.  Note  that, 
generally speaking, the results in this first part suggested a convergence between the perceptions of 
expatriate and local managers for most questions; only replies to Questions 1, 6 and 8 indicated a 
difference in sample averages, with a higher average for the expatriates.  
 
Table 3 
 
Statistical Results of the 2nd part of the Questionnaire 
 
Variables  Questionnaire Question 
Expat 
Aver. 
Local 
Aver. 
p-value  Highest 
13 – Communication with the Vale parent 
company is conducted solely via expatriates  2.6  2.6  0.959  -  Power 
31 – The local employees of the international 
subsidiary are implicitly or explicitly supervised 
by expatriates  
3.4  3.0  0.120  - 
14 – Expatriates seek to establish enduring 
professional relationships with local employees  3.5  3.1  0.230  - 
15 – Local employees seek to establish enduring 
professional relationships with expatriates  3.5  3.5  0.981  - 
Commitment 
16 – Expatriates pay attention to the specific 
needs of the international subsidiary   4.2  3.8  0.069  - 
9 – Communications between the Vale parent 
company and international subsidiaries are 
frequent  
3.1  3.5  0.280  - 
10 – Expatriates frequently transmit information 
and guidelines from Vale parent company   4.1  3.3  0.042*  Expat 
11 – Expatriates transmit information and 
guidelines in a clear and transparent way   3.8  3.0  0.012*  Expat 
Communication 
12 – Expatriates organize meetings about the 
Vale parent company   3.7  3.1  0.058  - 
Continues 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Variables  Questionnaire Question 
Expat 
Aver. 
Local 
Aver. 
p-value  Highest 
Flexibility  17 – In the international subsidiary, all 
important decisions require the Vale parent 
company’s approval  
4.1  3.8  0.268  - 
18 – Decisions that require the Vale parent 
company’s approval are taken in an agile 
manner 
2.6  2.5  0.551  - 
19 – In the international subsidiary, all 
important decisions require expatriate approval   3.9  3.6  0.313  - 
 
20 – All important decisions that require 
expatriate approval are taken in an agile manner   3.6  3.4  0.443  - 
21 – Decisions taken by expatriates are not 
negotiable   2.4  2.8  0.157  - 
28 – There is a high risk that the Vale parent 
company will not fulfill agreements with an 
international subsidiary  
2.0  2.7  0.013  Local 
 
Trust 
29 – There is a high risk that expatriates will not 
fulfill agreements with local employees   1.9  2.6  0.003  Local 
  30 – There is a risk that expatriates will act 
opportunistically   1.9  2.8  0.001  Local 
Note. * Kruskal-Wallis Test. Note: For all the questions of the second part of the questionnaire, the standard deviation 
showed a value equal to or less than 1.4.  
 
The statistical results of the second part of the questionnaire are presented in Table 3. We analyze 
these results below, beginning with the formal power corporate governance variable. Note that the 
format in this part was a Maximum 5 Likert scale. 
i)  In  the  case  of  the  power  variable,  the  results  were  not  conclusive.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
respondents perceived that the local employees were to a certain extent supervised by expatriates 
(Q. 31, Expat Av. 3.4; Local Av. 3.0). On the other hand, when asked whether communication 
with the Vale parent company was performed solely via expatriates, the replies were neutral (Q. 
13, Aver. 2.6). It was not possible to confirm whether the use of power by expatriate executives 
was coercive or non-coercive. 
ii)  As to commitment, the results were highly positive for all questions pertinent to this variable. 
They indicated that both expatriate and local employees sought to establish enduring professional 
relationships with each other, suggesting that there was a two-way, i.e. collaborative, commitment 
to their relationships (Q. 14, Av. 3.5;3.1; Q.15 Av. 3.5;3.5). The fact that expatriates were viewed 
as paying attention to the specific needs of the international subsidiary (Q. 16, Av. 4.2; 3.8) lent 
additional support to the evidence regarding this commitment. 
iii) In the case of the communication variable, the results were also very positive. They strongly 
suggested  that  communication,  which  included  the  organization  of  meetings  by  expatriates  to 
discuss parent company issues (Q 12 – Av. 3.7; 3.1), was carried out frequently (Q 9 – Av. 3.1; 3.5 
and Q.10 – Av. 4.1; 3.3) and in a clear and transparent fashion (Q.12 – Av. 3.8; 3.0).   
iv) As to the flexibility variable, the results were positive only to a certain extent. Although the 
respondents agreed that all important decisions that required expatriate approval were taken in an 
agile manner (Q.20 Av. 3.6; 3.4), they neither agreed nor disagreed that decisions that require the Contribution  of  Expatriates  in  the  Management  of  Subsidiaries  to  the  Corporate  Governance  of 
International Firms: the Case of Vale 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 7, n. 1, art. 6, pp. 98-114, Jan./Mar. 2010           www.anpad.org.br/bar 
109
Vale parent company’s approval were taken in such a manner (Q. 18, Av. 2.6.; 2.5). This was also 
the case regarding the statement that decisions taken by expatriates were not negotiable (Q.21, Av. 
2.4; 2.8).  
v)  Where the trust variable was concerned, the results in terms of expatriates’ perceptions were 
positive. Indeed they strongly suggested that from the latter’s perspective, there were no big risks 
that either the Vale parent company or the expatriates would not fulfill agreements with local 
employees (Q. 28 Av. 2.0 and Q. 29 Av. 1.9) or act opportunistically (Q. 30, Av. 1.9). On the other 
hand,  the  perceptions  of  local  executives  were  neutral  regarding  questions  pertinent  to  this 
variable.  
vi) With respect to the interdependence variable, the results were all very positive in terms of the 
perceptions of both populations. They were both of the opinion that the relationship with the 
international subsidiary was perceived as fundamental to the Vale parent company’s success (Q. 
22  Av.  4.4;  4.3)  and,  likewise,  albeit  not  as  intensely,  that  of  the  subsidiary  with  the  parent 
company was perceived as fundamental to the subsidiary’s success (Q.23, Av. 3.7; 3.8). These 
results are very relevant, especially in the light of those for Questions 1 and 3 of the first part of 
the questionnaire. While the latter confirmed the parent company’s strategic role in its network of 
relationships with international subsidiaries, the results pertinent to the interdependence variable 
reinforced the evidence of the strategic dimension of the relationships in this network.   
Question 24 explicitly addresses the issue of the contribution of expatriates who participate in the 
management of Vale’s international subsidiaries to the success of the relationship between Vale and its 
subsidiaries. Here, too, the results were highly positive (Av. 4.4.; 4.0). Viewed in conjunction with the 
other results concerning the interdependence variable, they strongly suggested that both populations 
perceived  that  the  role  of  expatriate  subsidiary  executives  was  critical  to  the  success  of  the 
management of the strategic network of relationships between the parent company and its subsidiaries.  
vii) As for the cultural integration variable, the results were not conclusive. Although the results 
suggested that expatriates mapped cultural differences and promoted guidance regarding these 
differences, at least according to the expatriates’ perceptions (Q. 26, Av. 3.0), this was not the case 
when  it  came  to  assessing  the  Vale  parent  company’s  role  in  this  respect  (Q.  25,  Av.  2.8). 
Furthermore, the results on the statement that conflicts from cultural differences are frequent were 
not perceived as significant (Q. 27, Av. 2.6; 2.5) by either expatriates or local managers. 
 
Discussion 
 
What is striking when analyzing the results presented above is the fact that they reveal positive 
implications in the case of practically all the variables pertinent to social mechanisms of corporate 
governance. At the same time, they point towards an active positive role on the part of expatriates 
where these variables are concerned. They, thus, strongly suggest that the participation of expatriates 
in the management of Vale’s international subsidiaries contributes to corporate governance through 
informal elements pertinent to social governance mechanisms.  
Inasmuch  as  corporate  governance  was  investigated  as  a  construct  of  the  network  management 
dimension in the SNA model, and in the light of assumption A4, these results lent strong support to 
our first supposition (S1): the participation of expatriates in the management of Vale’s international 
subsidiaries can be a critical success factor for the corporate governance of the company’s network of 
relationships with these subsidiaries, to the extent that they contribute informal elements concerning 
the social mechanisms of corporate governance.  
On  the  basis  of  the  perceptions  of  the  expatriates  that  represented  the  Vale  parent  company 
executives’  viewpoint  in  the  study,  the  results  also  provided  elements  to  support  our  second 
supposition  (S2):  the  Vale  parent  company  perceives  that  it  benefits  from  the  participation  of 
expatriates in the management of its international subsidiaries due to their contribution to the corporate 
governance of the parent company → subsidiary relationship. Indeed, when one considers the highly T. Diana L. van Aduard de Macedo-Soares, Adriana Maria Gutierrez Schubsky 
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positive results of Question 24 regarding the Interdependence variable, in the light of the positively 
reinforcing implications of the other network variables for corporate governance, network structure 
and ties, from the point of view of the Vale parent company expatriates, it becomes evident that the 
latter recognize the contribution of expatriates in the subsidiaries to the corporate governance of the 
relationship with them.  
Similarly, on the basis of the local executives’ perceptions of the aforementioned variables, we 
found evidence to support our third supposition (S3): the international subsidiaries also perceive that 
they benefit from the participation of the Vale parent company’s expatriates in their management due 
to their contribution to the corporate governance of the subsidiary→ parent company relationship. 
What is interesting is that the study revealed that this perception was less intense – that is, less 
positive  –  than  that  of  the  parent  company.  Indeed,  in  practically  all  the  results  regarding  this 
supposition, the averages for local managers were lower than those for the expatriates. For example, 
for  Questions  22  and  24  related  to  the  Interdependence  variable,  local  managers’  averages  were 
slightly lower than those of expatriates (Q.22: Expat Av. 4.4; Local Av. 4.3; Q. 24: Expat Av.: 4.4; 
Local Av. 4.0). Moreover, in the case of Question 1 regarding the strategic role of the Vale Parent 
company’s participation in the network, the average for expatriates was higher (Q.1 Expat Av. 4.3; 
Local Av. 3.8).  
In an attempt to understand this difference in perception, we reexamined the results for each one of 
the corporate governance variables. We found that those pertinent to the trust variable were neutral 
from the local managers’ viewpoint (see Loc. Av. for Q. 28, 29 and 30), whereas from the expatriates’ 
perspective they were fairly positive. This result made us wonder whether the local managers had 
doubts  regarding  the  extent  to  which  they  could  really  trust  the  Vale  parent  company  and  its 
expatriates in their relationships with the local employees. If this was the case, this could probably 
explain why, from the viewpoint of the local managers compared with that of the parent company, the 
benefit referred to in S3 was considered less positive. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
At this point, it is important to recall our research question: Is the participation of Vale’s expatriates 
in  the  management  of  its  international  subsidiaries  a  critical  success  factor  for  its  corporate 
governance?  
As  was  shown  here,  by  verifying  our  three  suppositions,  the  results  of  our  case  study  at  Vale 
strongly suggested that the expatriates in its international subsidiaries can indeed contribute to the 
success  of  its  corporate  governance  through  informal  elements  pertinent  to  social  governance 
mechanisms  inasmuch  as these  have  positive implications for  the  management  of  the  network  of 
relationships  with  its  subsidiaries.  Among  these  informal  elements,  commitment,  communication, 
flexibility, trust and interdependence were found to be especially significant, although on the whole 
their  beneficial  effect  in  most  cases  was  perceived  to  be  slightly  lower  from  the  subsidiaries´ 
viewpoint compared to that of the parent company.  
In this way, the article highlights the critical role of expatriate executives in the success of Vale’s 
corporate governance and thus answers our research question, while attending to our study’s specific 
objectives  regarding  whether  and  how  expatriate  managers  in  Vale’s  international  subsidiaries 
contribute to its corporate governance.   
By lending empirical support to research findings regarding the importance of complementing the 
use  of  formal  corporate  governance  methods  with  informal  ones,  concerning  social  governance 
mechanisms, the article adds value to the debate on the role of expatriates in the management of 
subsidiaries and their contribution to the corporate governance of international firms.  Contribution  of  Expatriates  in  the  Management  of  Subsidiaries  to  the  Corporate  Governance  of 
International Firms: the Case of Vale 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 7, n. 1, art. 6, pp. 98-114, Jan./Mar. 2010           www.anpad.org.br/bar 
111
Where business practitioners are concerned, the article provides insights for the top management of 
firms  by  showing  how  appointing  executives  to  international  positions  can  be  important  for  the 
company. It indeed becomes obvious that managers of international firms must pay more attention to 
social mechanisms of corporate governance and help develop the competencies for exercising such 
mechanisms as a network management tool. The research moreover provided some indicators for 
measuring social mechanisms that can be useful for enhancing effective network management. 
In addition, for academia these indicators contribute to the development of a more robust social 
corporate governance construct, making it possible to assess the positive and negative implications of 
each one of the variables associated with this construct. 
As  to  future  research,  we  highly  recommend  that  our  investigation  at  Vale  from  a  network 
perspective be replicated in other firms with international subsidiaries, following the same case study 
protocol, but with a much deeper analysis of each firm in the network focused on. The objective would 
be to verify to what extent our suppositions continue to be valid in spite of differences regarding the 
respective parent firm and subsidiary characteristics in the light of the argument of Kim et al. (2005) 
on  the  latter.  Such  an  analysis  should  include  in-depth  interviews  also  to  understand  better  the 
viewpoint of local managers in the international subsidiaries regarding complex questions such as 
those concerning trust and cultural integration variables and their implications for the perception of the 
beneficial effects of expatriate executives in these subsidiaries.  
Studies  of  the  social  corporate  governance  mechanisms  used  in  the  strategic  management  of 
networks  of  international  relationships  are  still  few  and  far  between.  Therefore,  there  are  vast 
opportunities for fresh contributions to research on this topic through pertinent investigations from a 
strategic network perspective of firms from different sectors that operate in the current context of 
growing internationalization.   
 
 
NOTE 
 
 
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the EIBA Conference 2008, Tallinn, Estonia. 
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